Collective Intervention: an Analysis of the Political Issues Regarding Secession, Self-Determination, and Sovereignty in the Republic of Kosovo by Werthan, Benjamin
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
University Honors Theses University Honors College 
2016 
Collective Intervention: an Analysis of the Political 
Issues Regarding Secession, Self-Determination, and 
Sovereignty in the Republic of Kosovo 
Benjamin Werthan 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/honorstheses 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Werthan, Benjamin, "Collective Intervention: an Analysis of the Political Issues Regarding Secession, Self-
Determination, and Sovereignty in the Republic of Kosovo" (2016). University Honors Theses. Paper 219. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/honors.216 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors 
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more 
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
Collective	  Intervention:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  political	  Issues	  regarding	  Secession,	  Self-­‐







An	  undergraduate	  honors	  thesis	  submitted	  in	  partial	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  	  
requirements	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  	  








David	  Kinsella,	  	  








	   2	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
	  
Abstract	  ....................................................................................................................................................	  3	  
Research	  Question	  ................................................................................................................................	  4	  
Background	  .............................................................................................................................................	  5	  
Methodology	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  8	  
Literature	  Review	  ..............................................................................................................................	  11	  
International	  Law	  and	  Friction	  in	  Kosovo	  .................................................................................................	  11	  
Milosevic’s	  Reign	  .............................................................................................................................................	  13	  
Kosovo	  –	  Its	  own	  nation	  ................................................................................................................................	  16	  
Serbian	  Fear	  in	  Kosovo	  ..................................................................................................................................	  17	  
International	  Mediation	  ................................................................................................................................	  18	  
Final	  Status	  .......................................................................................................................................................	  28	  
Assessment	  by	  the	  ICJ	  ....................................................................................................................................	  32	  
Conclusion	  ............................................................................................................................................	  36	  










	   3	  
Abstract:	  
In	  2008,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo,	  after	  years	  of	  war	  and	  internal	  conflicts	  between	  the	  
ethnic	  Albanians	  and	  Serbians	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  territory,	  finally	  received	  status	  as	  an	  
independent	  state.	  The	  process	  was	  long	  and	  even	  after	  declaring	  independence	  the	  
Republic	  still	  had	  to	  fight	  for	  such	  recognition.	  This	  thesis	  explores	  that	  process,	  starting	  
with	  the	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  Yugoslav	  Wars,	  through	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo’s	  Declaration	  of	  
Independence	  and	  the	  subsequent	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  advisory	  opinion.	  	  The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  concepts	  of	  self-­‐determination	  and	  state	  sovereignty	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  international	  organizations,	  NATO	  and	  the	  United	  
Nations,	  while	  also	  determining	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  those	  actions	  when	  scrutinized	  under	  
International	  law.	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  literature	  review	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  
intervention	  done	  by	  NATO	  and	  the	  United	  Nations,	  while	  hindering	  on	  Serbia’s	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Research	  Question:	  	  
How	  has	  the	  intercession	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  NATO,	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo,	  
impacted	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  and	  the	  subsequent	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Background:	  
	  
The	  situation	  in	  the	  newly	  independent	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  was	  a	  dire	  one.	  On	  one	  
side	  of	  the	  Kosovo	  War	  were	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanians.	  This	  group	  made	  up	  almost	  88%	  of	  the	  
total	  population	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  Kosovo.1	  On	  the	  other	  end	  you	  have	  the	  Serbs,	  who	  
fought	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (FRY)	  population,	  the	  group	  
whom	  attempted	  to	  be	  the	  main,	  legal	  successor	  to	  the	  Socialist	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  
Yugoslavia	  (SFRY)	  after	  the	  disbandment	  of	  the	  latter,	  during	  the	  post-­‐Yugoslav	  War	  era	  in	  
1992.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  FRY,	  some	  states,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States,	  refused	  
to	  acknowledge	  this	  name	  and	  instead	  referred	  to	  the	  state	  as	  Serbia	  and	  Montenegro.2	  	  
The	  territories,	  which	  comprised	  the	  previous	  SFRY,	  were	  slowly	  separating	  into	  
their	  own	  legal	  states,	  which	  caused	  great	  tension	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  new	  FRY,	  
encompassed	  by	  Serbia	  and	  Montenegro,	  was	  determined	  to	  hold	  together	  what	  remained	  
of	  their	  “kingdom,”	  before	  multiple	  wars	  tore	  the	  region	  apart.	  Kosovo,	  which	  was	  still	  an	  
autonomous	  (although	  not	  solely	  independent)	  province	  of	  the	  Socialist	  Republic	  of	  Serbia	  
(SR	  Serbia),	  was	  determined	  to	  force	  the	  hand	  of	  their	  current	  government	  and	  seek	  
representation	  that	  better	  embodied	  the	  people	  living	  within	  the	  territory	  (the	  
aforementioned	  Kosovar	  Albanians).	  Upon	  this	  final	  decision	  to	  rebel	  and	  fight	  for	  Kosovo,	  
the	  ethnic	  Albanians	  created	  the	  Kosovo	  Liberation	  Army	  (KLA)3	  which	  was	  used	  as	  a	  force	  
to	  separate	  from	  the	  FRY	  and	  seek	  sovereignty	  as	  its	  own	  independent	  state.	  The	  Kosovo	  
Liberation	  Army	  was	  a	  paramilitary	  organization	  that	  sought	  the	  separation	  of	  Kosovo	  
from	  Yugoslavia.”4	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  KLA,	  there	  was	  overwhelming	  support	  
coming	  from	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  territory	  that	  wanted	  to	  separate	  and	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become	  an	  independent	  sovereign	  state;	  99%	  support	  for	  a	  referendum	  of	  independence	  
within	  the	  SFRY,	  with	  87%	  participation	  of	  the	  population	  partaking	  in	  the	  poll.5	  	  
The	  main	  issue	  surrounding	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  Kosovo	  was	  the	  
tension	  between	  two	  ethnic	  groups:	  Serbians,	  who	  were	  the	  largest	  ethnic	  minority	  group,	  
and	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanians,	  who	  made	  up	  the	  ethnic	  majority	  and	  overwhelmingly	  
outnumbered	  the	  Serb	  population.	  The	  population	  of	  SR	  Serbia	  and	  their	  leader,	  Slobodan	  
Milosevic,	  backed	  the	  Serbian	  population	  in	  Kosovo.	  Milosevic	  led	  SR	  Serbia	  as	  president	  
before	  becoming	  the	  president	  of	  the	  FRY	  during	  the	  height	  of	  terror	  and	  tension	  within	  the	  
state.	  His	  human	  rights	  violations,	  by	  way	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  Army	  and	  Serbian	  police,	  
towards	  the	  people	  within	  the	  territory	  were	  the	  main	  cause	  for	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanian	  
population	  to	  seek	  independence	  and	  sovereignty.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  kidnappings,	  
massacres,	  public	  destruction	  of	  property,	  including	  churches	  and	  cemeteries	  and	  
summary	  executions	  performed	  by	  the	  KLA,	  among	  other	  crimes,	  were	  the	  most	  pressing	  
concerns	  for	  the	  Serbian	  population	  to	  fear	  Kosovar	  Albanian	  takeover	  and	  subsequent	  
independence	  of	  Kosovo.6	  The	  only	  problem	  left	  for	  the	  rebel	  group	  was	  gaining	  enough	  
support	  from	  the	  international	  community	  to	  help	  their	  efforts	  to	  restore	  human	  rights	  for	  
the	  people	  and	  to	  provide	  safety	  for	  all	  within	  the	  war	  zone.	  
This	  thesis	  fits	  in	  the	  academic	  field	  of	  two	  topics;	  international	  law	  and	  
international	  relations.	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  study	  of	  international	  law	  plays	  a	  part	  in	  fully	  
understanding	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  disagreement	  and	  subsequent	  rebellion	  within	  the	  territory	  
of	  Kosovo.	  The	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  and,	  even	  more	  specifically,	  the	  right	  of	  external	  
self-­‐determination	  are	  the	  center	  of	  attention	  in	  this	  narrative.	  This	  thesis,	  comprised	  as	  a	  
literature	  review,	  will	  describe	  and	  summarize	  in	  detail	  this	  right,	  and	  how	  other	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international	  authorities,	  such	  as	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  and	  the	  
United	  Nations	  (UN),	  influenced	  such	  decisions.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐
determination	  and	  what	  role	  those	  international	  authorities	  played	  is	  where	  the	  study	  of	  
international	  relations	  is	  related	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  study	  of	  International	  relations	  is	  an	  
interdisciplinary	  subject	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  many	  factors,	  such	  as	  economics,	  political	  
science,	  history,	  foreign	  languages	  and	  others.7	  Both	  of	  these	  academic	  fields	  formed	  the	  
framework	  and	  starting	  point	  for	  this	  analysis.	  	  
In	  1945,	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  formed.	  The	  cause	  of	  the	  organization’s	  formation	  
was	  to	  be	  a	  protection	  against	  the	  possibility	  of,	  and	  hopes	  of	  preventing	  a	  third	  world	  war.	  
Nations	  would	  join	  and	  voluntarily	  submit	  some	  of	  their	  sovereign	  power	  to	  the	  
international	  organization	  under	  the	  belief	  that	  presenting	  a	  united	  front	  against	  the	  
threats	  to,	  “peace	  and	  security,	  climate	  change,	  sustainable	  development,	  human	  rights,	  
disarmament,	  terrorism,	  humanitarian	  and	  health	  emergencies,	  gender	  equality,	  
governance,	  food	  production	  and	  more”	  would	  subside	  threats	  more	  efficiently	  and	  
effectively.8	  The	  term	  “United	  Nations”	  was	  coined	  by	  US	  President	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  in	  
1942	  and	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  its	  formation9,	  even	  though	  some	  of	  the	  threats	  of	  the	  21st	  
century,	  listed	  above,	  were	  unknown	  at	  the	  time,	  specifically	  climate	  change.	  	  
The	  organization	  has	  had	  193	  members	  officially	  join,	  with	  two	  other	  nations	  acting	  
solely	  in	  observation.10	  With	  this	  large	  number	  of	  members	  and	  these	  nations	  having	  many	  
contrasting	  interests,	  the	  UN	  has	  provided	  a	  chance	  to	  form	  dialogue	  between	  nations	  and	  
laid	  out	  a	  stage	  for	  negotiations	  to	  be	  had,	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  potentially	  hostile	  
communications	  from	  becoming	  dangerous	  and	  solved	  in	  a	  diplomatic	  manner.	  As	  part	  of	  
the	  introduction	  of	  the	  UN,	  there	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  which	  has	  acted	  as	  a	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treaty	  among	  all	  member	  states	  who	  have	  joined.	  A	  main	  section	  of	  the	  Charter	  discusses	  
the	  rights	  of	  self-­‐determination	  among	  each	  nation	  state,	  which	  is	  essential	  in	  the	  
understanding	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  sovereign	  states.	  In	  its	  most	  simplistic	  form,	  self-­‐
determination	  is	  the,	  “principle	  of	  equal	  rights	  and	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity,	  [where	  
people]	  have	  the	  right	  to	  freely	  choose	  their	  sovereignty	  and	  international	  political	  status	  
with	  no	  external	  compulsion	  or	  interference.”11	  	  
The	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  is	  comprised	  of	  28	  member	  states,	  
all	  of	  which	  are	  also	  members	  of	  the	  UN.	  The	  organization’s	  stated	  purpose	  is	  one	  of	  
freedom	  and	  security	  for	  its	  members,	  resolved	  through	  political	  and	  military	  means.12	  The	  
efforts	  of	  NATO,	  to	  show	  states	  of	  different	  values	  as	  united	  for	  a	  common	  goal,	  which	  is	  to	  
resolve	  disputes	  peacefully	  and	  diplomatically,	  are	  equal	  to	  that	  of	  the	  UN.	  NATO,	  also	  like	  
the	  UN,	  commits	  to	  resolving	  issues	  peacefully	  during	  times	  of	  negotiations,	  but	  will	  
provide	  a	  strong	  military	  front	  if	  necessary.	  This	  quick	  look	  into	  the	  UN	  and	  NATO,	  by	  
stating	  their	  purposes	  and	  ultimate	  goals,	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  background	  from	  where	  these	  
international	  organizations	  were	  coming	  from	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Kosovo	  that	  
will	  be	  further	  explained	  and	  analyzed	  throughout	  this	  essay.	  
This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  dire	  moments	  in	  the	  history,	  and	  eventual	  establishment	  of	  
the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  and	  the	  importance	  that	  the	  two	  international	  organizations,	  NATO	  
and	  the	  UN,	  played	  in	  stabilizing	  this	  region	  in	  southeast	  Europe.	  The	  ethnic	  tension	  and	  
violence	  between	  a	  huge	  part	  of	  the	  population	  of	  a	  sovereign	  state	  and	  one	  of	  its	  own	  
provinces,	  massive	  human	  rights	  violations	  such	  as	  ethnic	  cleansing	  and	  mass	  murders,	  
and	  corrupt	  government	  officials	  provided	  the	  context	  and	  importance	  of	  this	  issue	  within	  
the	  global	  community.	  This	  context,	  it	  is	  contended	  throughout	  the	  paper,	  explains	  that	  the	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international	  organizations	  properly	  intervened	  and	  intruded	  on	  the	  disputes	  that	  were	  
taking	  place	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  a	  sovereign	  state,	  an	  issue	  that	  the	  global	  community	  has	  
had	  difficulty	  dealing	  with	  in	  the	  past.	  Protocols	  were	  broken	  in	  the	  process	  of	  solving	  the	  
issues	  in	  Kosovo	  and	  this	  thesis	  is	  an	  analysis	  and	  justification	  as	  to	  why	  breaking	  the	  rules	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Methodology:	  
The	  process	  in	  which	  I	  undertook	  this	  thesis	  was	  that	  of	  a	  long	  literature	  review.	  I	  
gathered	  up	  many	  sources	  (journal	  articles,	  newspaper	  articles,	  official	  court	  documents,	  
government	  websites,	  etc.)	  to	  create	  an	  overall	  evaluation	  of	  the	  work	  that	  has	  been	  done	  
on	  this	  topic.	  From	  these	  sources,	  I	  created	  this	  work	  as	  a	  conclusion	  of	  taking	  all	  these	  
accounts	  and	  works	  as	  a	  whole.	  These	  sources	  covered	  many	  areas	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  my	  
topic.	  These	  areas	  include	  official	  documents	  from	  the	  United	  Nations,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘Interim	  
Agreement	  for	  Peace	  and	  Self-­‐Government	  in	  Kosovo’	  for	  example,	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  
Kosovo,	  in	  addition	  to	  official	  transcripts	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice’s	  oral	  
arguments	  and	  advisory	  opinion.	  I	  also	  used	  many	  academic	  journal	  articles	  and	  other	  
publications	  that	  examined	  topics	  such	  as	  mine	  or	  were	  closely	  related,	  such	  as	  ‘UNMIK	  in	  
Kosovo:	  Struggling	  with	  Uncertainty’	  by	  Jürgen	  Friedrich	  and	  ‘NATO’s	  Humanitarian	  War	  
over	  Kosovo’	  by	  Adam	  Roberts.	  My	  last	  main	  sources	  came	  from	  government	  websites	  that	  
provided	  definitions	  or	  clarifications	  on	  other	  primary	  source	  articles.	  	  
Most	  of	  my	  sources	  were	  found	  online	  from	  Portland	  State	  databases.	  There	  were	  a	  
couple	  books	  that	  played	  a	  role	  in	  my	  research.	  	  International	  Law,	  by	  Vaughn	  Low,	  was	  a	  
tremendous	  source	  I	  was	  able	  to	  use	  in	  helping	  research	  the	  topic	  of	  self-­‐determination	  as	  a	  
whole	  even	  though	  the	  source	  was	  not	  cited	  in	  this	  work.	  The	  databases	  I	  used	  most	  were	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Literature	  Review:	  
International	  Law	  and	  friction	  in	  Kosovo	  
International	  law	  is	  the	  external	  “governing	  force”	  keeping	  the	  international	  
community	  in	  order.	  There	  is	  no	  realm	  possible	  for	  International	  law	  to	  require	  states	  to	  
abide	  by	  its	  rules	  (without	  a	  single	  hegemonic	  power),	  which	  makes	  the	  concept	  tricky	  to	  
understand	  in	  terms	  of	  solidifying	  its	  standing	  on	  the	  international	  stage.	  In	  addition,	  
international	  law	  has	  been	  a	  social	  function	  since	  before	  both	  World	  Wars	  and	  is	  nearly	  
impossible	  to	  enforce.	  Philip	  Allott,	  in	  his	  article	  “The	  Concept	  of	  International	  Law,”	  stated	  
a	  threefold	  task	  I	  believe	  succinctly	  articulates	  the	  premise	  of	  law.13	  First	  he	  states	  “law	  
carries	  the	  structures	  and	  systems	  of	  a	  society	  through	  time.”	  Secondly,	  “law	  inserts	  the	  
common	  interest	  of	  society	  into	  the	  behavior	  of	  society	  members.”	  And	  lastly,	  “law	  
establishes	  possible	  futures	  for	  society,	  in	  accordance	  with	  societies	  theories,	  values,	  and	  
purposes.”	  Applying	  these	  facets	  and	  attributes	  of	  Allott’s	  definition	  of	  what	  law	  is,	  to	  the	  
global	  stage,	  presents	  obvious	  complications	  because	  each	  state	  has	  its	  own	  culture,	  ethics,	  
morals	  and	  values.	  If	  there	  is	  disconnect	  between	  the	  people	  and	  the	  government	  (who	  
creates	  and	  enforces	  the	  laws)	  then	  there	  will	  be	  civil	  strife	  in	  those	  areas.	  In	  Kosovo,	  there	  
was	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  contention	  due	  to	  a	  government	  repressing	  and	  violating	  the	  
human	  rights	  of	  its	  people	  and	  the	  backlash	  from	  those	  violations.	  
One	  of	  the	  biggest	  disconnects	  in	  Kosovo	  was	  that	  the	  laws	  did	  not	  line	  up	  with	  what	  
a	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  felt	  was	  right	  or	  believed	  to	  be	  morally	  correct.14	  Throughout	  
the	  years,	  before	  the	  Yugoslav	  Wars,	  Kosovo’s	  Albanian	  population	  continued	  to	  rise	  
dramatically,	  reaching	  almost	  90%	  of	  the	  population,	  while	  the	  Serb	  population	  in	  the	  
territory	  continued	  to	  fall,	  hitting	  8%	  as	  many	  of	  them	  left	  the	  area.15	  Even	  as	  this	  trend	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continued,	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  encountered	  constant	  discrimination,	  especially	  once	  
Slobodan	  Milosevic	  took	  control	  of	  Serbia	  and	  subsequently	  took	  over	  control	  of	  the	  
Socialist	  Autonomous	  Province	  of	  Kosovo	  in	  1989.16	  Once	  Milosevic	  gained	  power	  in	  Serbia,	  
Kosovo	  became	  under	  fire	  even	  more	  so.	  Milosevic	  was	  particularly	  resilient	  towards	  his	  
dislike	  of	  Kosovo	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Kosovo,	  one	  of	  Serbia’s	  territories	  constantly	  
voted	  against	  Serbia	  in	  their	  federal	  government.17	  In	  1974,	  Yugoslavia	  amended	  its	  
constitution	  and	  gave	  sovereign	  control	  to	  the	  republics	  of	  Slovenia,	  Croatia,	  Bosnia-­‐
Herzegovina,	  Montenegro,	  and	  Macedonia	  over	  each	  of	  their	  respective	  territories.18	  Serbia,	  
however,	  did	  not	  receive	  such	  sovereignty,	  as	  the	  province	  of	  Kosovo	  was	  given	  
prerogatives	  equal	  to	  that	  of	  a	  republic,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  have	  its	  own	  administration,	  
assembly	  and	  judiciary.19	  The	  reason	  for	  Kosovo	  being	  given	  special	  status	  began	  with	  the	  
formation	  of	  Yugoslavia	  at	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  in	  1945	  and	  the	  dispute	  between	  
Albania	  and	  Serbia.	  Both	  states	  thought	  they	  had	  the	  right	  over	  the	  territory	  and	  have	  for	  
years.	  Albania’s	  claim	  relied	  on	  them	  being	  the	  “original	  inhabitants”	  of	  the	  land,	  as	  they	  
were	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  ancient	  Illyrians.20	  Serbia’s	  claim	  was	  based	  on	  their	  insistence	  
that	  Kosovo	  was	  positioned	  in	  the	  “middle	  of	  its	  medieval	  kingdoms”	  and	  that	  no	  Albanians	  
lived	  amongst	  them.21	  Serbia	  did	  eventually	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  territory	  but	  the	  dispute	  
caused	  trouble	  for	  Yugoslavia,	  as	  Albanian	  uprisings	  throughout	  the	  time	  period	  of	  1945	  
until	  1974	  continued.22	  These	  troubles	  lasted	  up	  until	  the	  1974	  Constitutional	  adoption	  
when	  Kosovo	  gained	  autonomous	  status.	  Milosevic,	  from	  the	  moment	  he	  took	  office,	  sought	  
out	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  national	  Serbian	  pride	  throughout	  both	  Serbia	  and	  for	  those	  in	  the	  
territory	  of	  Kosovo.23	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	  great	  heights	  of	  Milosevic’s	  Serbian	  nationalistic	  
pride	  very	  easily	  could	  have	  stemmed	  from	  Serbia’s	  loss	  of	  territorial	  autonomy	  from	  the	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1974	  Yugoslavian	  Constitution.	  His	  main	  goal	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  Albanian	  population	  to	  
“second	  class	  citizens”24	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  his	  usage	  of	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  hatred	  to	  gain	  
political	  power.	  
Milosevic’s	  Reign	  
Due	  to	  the	  tremendous	  height	  of	  Albanian	  nationalism	  that	  had	  been	  continuing	  to	  
rise	  in	  Kosovo,	  and	  the	  discrimination	  against	  the	  Serbs	  (by	  the	  local	  Albanians),	  Milosevic	  
took	  matters	  into	  his	  own	  hands.	  In	  the	  early	  months	  of	  1989,	  he	  led	  the	  charge	  of	  Serbian	  
nationalism	  back	  to	  center	  stage,	  and	  the	  first	  thing	  he	  needed	  to	  do:	  amend	  the	  Serbian	  
Constitution.25	  Yugoslavia’s	  National	  Assembly	  allowed	  the	  amendments	  to	  take	  place,	  
stating	  that	  the	  previous	  (1974)	  Yugoslavian	  Constitutional	  changes	  were	  actually	  
unconstitutional	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  post	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  goal	  of	  Yugoslavia	  was	  to	  
provide	  a	  stability	  in	  the	  region	  by	  forming	  a	  Yugoslavia	  with	  six	  equal	  republics.26	  Because	  
of	  Serbia’s	  lack	  of	  sovereign	  control	  over	  its	  territories,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  
Yugoslavian	  National	  Assembly	  stated	  that	  the	  1974	  Constitutional	  changes	  violated	  the	  
country’s	  Anti-­‐Fascist	  Council	  as	  well.27	  In	  these	  1989	  Constitutional	  amendments,	  it	  was	  
decided	  that:	  Serbian	  laws	  overruled	  and	  took	  precedent	  over	  all	  provincial	  laws,	  Serbia	  
controlled	  judicial	  appointments	  and	  firings,	  provincial	  economic	  and	  educational	  policies	  
were	  to	  be	  coordinated	  with	  Serbia,	  and	  lastly,	  and	  quite	  possibly	  most	  importantly,	  the	  
“provinces	  lost	  their	  diplomatic	  role,	  military	  powers	  and	  much	  of	  their	  police	  power.”28	  
Kosovo	  could	  no	  longer	  veto	  changes	  to	  the	  Serbian	  Constitution	  and	  were	  in	  a	  substantial	  
disadvantage	  in	  almost	  every	  possible	  way.	  	  
Milosevic	  was	  not	  quite	  done	  with	  this	  matter	  however	  as	  before	  the	  Constitutional	  
amendments	  could	  occur,	  Kosovo’s	  (and	  the	  other	  at-­‐the-­‐time-­‐still-­‐autonomous	  provinces)	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Assembly	  had	  to	  pass	  the	  changes	  by	  a	  three-­‐fourths	  majority.	  In	  what	  was	  a	  situation	  
clearly	  stacked	  with	  threats	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  coercion	  against	  the	  people	  of	  Kosovo,	  the	  
amendments	  were	  passed.29	  The	  clear	  coercion	  in	  the	  situation	  regarding	  control	  of	  the	  
province	  of	  Kosovo	  was	  astronomically	  corrupt.	  First,	  there	  was	  no	  three-­‐fourths	  majority	  
decision,	  but	  the	  amendment	  passed	  anyways.30	  Second,	  there	  was	  no	  quorum	  present	  at	  
the	  assembly	  during	  time	  of	  voting.31	  Thirdly,	  random	  security	  personnel	  were	  allowed	  to	  
vote	  in	  addition	  to	  representatives	  from	  Belgrade	  receiving	  a	  vote	  and	  counting	  towards	  
the	  “majority”	  decision	  (Belgrade,	  the	  capital	  of	  Serbia,	  is	  not	  located	  in	  Kosovo,	  and	  should	  
not	  represent	  a	  vote).32	  Fourth,	  voters	  were	  threatened	  if	  voting	  “no”,	  while	  some	  votes	  
were	  plainly	  not	  counted.33	  Lastly,	  the	  vote	  took	  place	  while	  Kosovo	  was	  announced	  being	  
in	  a	  “state	  of	  exception/emergency”	  with	  disorder	  in	  the	  province	  and	  the	  mobilization	  of	  
the	  military.34	  	  
Kosovo	  was,	  in	  fact,	  in	  a	  real	  state	  of	  emergency.	  During	  the	  time	  of	  the	  vote,	  major	  
riots	  and	  protests	  began	  to	  take	  place,	  eventually	  placing	  the	  province	  in	  a	  state	  of	  martial	  
law	  that	  continued	  for	  months	  after	  the	  vote.35	  On	  June	  28th,	  1989	  Milosevic	  gave	  his	  
infamous	  Gazimestan	  speech	  in	  which	  he	  stated	  that	  the	  future	  of	  Serbia	  could	  be	  led	  by	  the	  
possibility	  of	  “armed	  battles”	  to	  lead	  Serbian	  national	  development.36	  The	  speech	  praises	  
the	  passage	  of	  the	  new	  Constitution,	  stating,	  “Through	  the	  play	  of	  history	  and	  life,	  it	  seems	  
as	  if	  Serbia	  has,	  precisely	  in	  this	  year,	  in	  1989,	  regained	  its	  state	  and	  its	  dignity	  and	  thus	  has	  
celebrated	  an	  event	  of	  the	  distant	  past	  which	  has	  a	  great	  historical	  and	  symbolic	  
significance	  for	  its	  future.”37	  Many	  believe	  that	  this	  statement	  was	  the	  message	  he	  was	  
trying	  to	  portray	  for	  the	  entire	  speech,	  essentially	  what	  its	  entire	  meaning	  was	  all	  about;	  
that	  Serbia	  had	  suffered	  greatly	  in	  the	  past,	  which	  brought	  down	  national	  Serbian	  pride,	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and	  with	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  central	  role	  of	  Serbia	  (by	  weakening	  the	  province	  of	  
Kosovo),	  they	  (pride	  of	  the	  people	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  government)	  would	  rise	  together	  to	  
restore	  Serbia	  to	  its	  former	  glory.	  The	  speech	  was	  viewed	  as	  the	  turning	  point	  for	  
Yugoslavia	  and	  ultimately	  was	  a	  seen	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  Wars.	  Milosevic	  
played	  the	  emotions	  of	  his	  followers	  very	  effectively,	  knowing	  that	  he	  could	  use	  the	  
message	  of	  Serbian	  pride	  to	  consolidate	  his	  power.	  Eventually,	  Slovenia,	  other	  surrounding	  
states,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Soviets	  and	  western	  European	  states	  began	  to	  take	  sides	  on	  the	  
conflict.	  	  
While	  Milosevic	  was	  rallying	  up	  fellow	  Serbian	  followers,	  Kosovo	  was	  in	  an	  
extremely	  vulnerable	  position.	  The	  people	  (mostly	  of	  Albanian	  ethnicity)	  wanted	  secession	  
from	  Serbia.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  began	  a	  non-­‐violent	  uprising	  of	  civil	  
disobedience	  with	  the	  goal	  being	  independence	  for	  Kosovo.38	  In	  1991,	  Kosovo	  declared	  its	  
own	  independence,	  after	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  Kosovo	  Parliament	  announced,	  by	  way	  of	  an	  
independence	  referendum,	  that	  the	  new	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  would	  be	  known	  as	  an	  
independent	  state	  and	  a	  republic	  of	  Yugoslavia.39	  The	  Independence	  Referendum	  was	  a	  
public	  vote	  that	  got	  a	  turnout	  of	  just	  over	  87%	  of	  the	  population	  and	  resulted	  in	  99.98%	  
“yes”	  votes	  in	  favor	  of	  declaring	  independence.40	  This	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  2008	  
official	  declaration	  of	  independence,	  as	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  (from	  1991)	  was	  only	  
recognized	  as	  independent	  by	  one	  other	  state:	  Albania.	  In	  2000,	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Kosovo	  
War,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  officially	  disbanded	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Interim	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Kosovo	  –	  Its	  own	  nation	  	  
It	  is	  estimated	  that	  about	  15%	  of	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  were	  displaced	  prior	  to	  
NATO	  intervention	  in	  1998	  (about	  250,000	  out	  of	  1.6	  million,	  although	  some	  estimates	  
reach	  as	  high	  as	  400,000).41	  There	  were	  also	  thousands	  of	  deaths	  in	  the	  preceding	  months	  
(about	  1,500	  according	  to	  the	  NATO	  website).42	  Serbian	  police	  were	  the	  cause	  of	  many	  
deaths	  to	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanian’s.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  was	  the	  Kosovo	  Liberation	  Army	  (KLA)	  
whom	  also	  contributed	  to	  many	  civilian	  casualties.	  With	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  KLA,	  which	  
radicalized	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanian	  group,	  came	  the	  extreme	  responses	  and	  retaliation	  by	  the	  
Serbian	  police	  and	  Yugoslavian	  Army.	  It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  Serbian	  nationalism	  and	  the	  
actions	  they	  took	  only	  heightened	  Albanian	  nationalism	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  sides	  were	  
reaching	  points	  of	  extreme	  polarization	  in	  which	  there	  was	  no	  going	  back	  from.	  	  The	  
Kosovar	  Albanian’s	  were	  fighting	  for	  their	  lives	  and	  for	  independence,	  while	  the	  Serbian’s	  
were	  fighting	  for	  their	  lives	  and	  to	  keep	  sovereign	  control	  of	  their	  territory,	  one	  that	  has	  
been	  described	  as	  the	  “heartland	  of	  Serbian	  history,	  culture	  and	  religion.”43	  
Both	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  and	  Serbians	  had	  experienced	  extreme	  displacement	  
caused	  by	  the	  fighting	  and	  constant	  danger.44	  It	  wasn’t	  until	  early	  1998,	  not	  long	  after	  the	  
Kosovo	  War	  had	  begun,	  that	  NATO	  and	  other	  international	  organizations	  began	  to	  take	  a	  
stand	  in	  the	  fight.	  NATO	  officials	  were	  eager	  to	  end	  the	  violence	  and	  many	  were	  concerned	  
with	  the	  total	  disregard	  for	  a	  diplomatic	  and	  peaceful	  end	  of	  the	  situation,	  mostly	  on	  the	  
side	  of	  Milosevic.45	  NATO’s	  primary	  goal	  was	  to	  ‘help	  to	  achieve	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  of	  the	  
crisis	  by	  contributing	  to	  the	  response	  of	  the	  international	  community.46	  As	  the	  crisis	  
continued	  into	  the	  middle	  and	  end	  of	  1998,	  NATO	  decided	  on	  swift	  action	  to	  end	  the	  
dispute	  and	  bring	  peace	  back	  to	  the	  region.	  Air	  strikes	  were	  called	  at	  which	  point	  Milosevic	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finally	  agreed	  on	  a	  cease-­‐fire,	  which	  lasted	  until	  early	  1999,	  when	  provocation	  from	  both	  
sides	  resulted	  in	  excessive	  force	  by	  the	  Serbian	  police	  that	  heated	  up	  the	  violence	  once	  
more.47	  	  
Serbian	  Fear	  in	  Kosovo	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Milosevic	  instilled	  fear	  and	  a	  state	  of	  panic	  among	  the	  ethnic	  
Albanians	  causing	  them	  to	  want	  to	  secede,	  the	  Serbs	  also	  had	  reason	  to	  panic.	  The	  idea	  of	  
Kosovo	  becoming	  independent	  did	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  the	  Serbs	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  territory.	  
While	  the	  Yugoslav	  Army	  and	  Serbian	  police	  forces	  patrolled	  the	  streets	  (before	  the	  
drawback	  post-­‐NATO	  bombing),	  so	  too	  did	  the	  KLA.	  The	  practice	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  
was	  not	  just	  placed	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  the	  Serbian	  forces	  but	  also	  on	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
Kosovo	  Liberation	  Army.	  There	  were	  over	  200,000	  Serbian	  people	  who	  were	  forced	  from	  
their	  homes48	  that	  also	  saw	  Serbian	  churches	  and	  schools	  burned	  to	  the	  ground.	  This	  
massive	  amount	  of	  displaced	  persons	  is	  in	  fact	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  a	  human	  rights	  violation.	  
While	  the	  ethnic	  Serbs	  had	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  Serbian	  government	  and	  Yugoslav	  Army,	  the	  
sheer	  difference	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  people	  in	  the	  ethnic	  groups,	  even	  before	  the	  massive	  
displacement	  took	  place,	  was	  huge.	  Combine	  this	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  non-­‐violent	  
practices	  that	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  took	  up	  were	  replaced	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  
church	  and	  school	  burnings,	  in	  addition	  to	  mass	  murders	  of	  the	  Serbians,	  including	  
children,	  and	  hostages	  that	  the	  KLA	  kept,	  meant	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  victimless	  circumstance	  
on	  either	  side.49	  	  
Furthermore,	  reports	  surfaced	  that	  many	  members	  of	  the	  KLA	  were	  not	  just	  seeking	  
independence	  for	  Kosovo	  but	  also	  sought	  out	  a	  concept	  known	  as	  “Greater	  Albania.”50	  The	  
Greater	  Albania	  movement,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Ethnic	  Albania	  movement,	  dates	  back	  to	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1878	  and	  encompasses	  the	  ideology	  to	  reclaim	  and	  reoccupy	  all	  of	  a	  lost	  homeland	  of	  
Albania,	  to	  unify	  a	  territory	  that	  is	  for	  Albanians	  only.51	  This	  movement	  incorporated	  a	  
couple	  of	  essential	  requirements	  for	  Greater	  Albania	  to	  succeed.52	  First,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  
foreign	  intervention	  done	  by	  a	  Superpower	  country	  or	  organization.	  This	  was	  because	  
Albanians	  were	  minority	  in	  the	  land	  they	  sought	  to	  gain	  control	  of,	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  take	  
this	  land	  back	  was	  by	  war,	  which	  Albanians	  alone	  could	  not	  win.	  Second,	  ethnic	  groups	  
must	  be	  targeted	  as	  the	  enemy.	  This	  target,	  created	  by	  supporters	  of	  the	  Greater	  Albania	  
movement,	  would	  be	  comprised	  of	  those	  who	  oppressed	  Albanian	  victims.	  Finally,	  ethnic	  
homogeneousness	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  ethnically	  pure	  religion	  was	  essential.	  The	  entire	  
basis	  for	  this	  ideology	  was	  to	  cleanse	  “Ethnic	  Albania”	  from	  all	  other	  ethnicities.	  This	  point	  
was	  essential.	  It	  was	  for	  these	  reasons	  that	  the	  radicalized	  KLA	  was	  seen	  by	  some	  as	  a	  
terrorist	  organization,	  one	  that	  Serbians	  in	  Kosovo	  experienced	  firsthand.	  	  
International	  Mediation	  	  
Throughout	  the	  1990’s	  and	  heading	  into	  1998,	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  Kosovar	  
Albanians	  and	  the	  Serbs	  was	  at	  its	  height.	  	  Both	  sides	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  Yugoslav	  Army	  plus	  
Serbian	  police	  force	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  KLA	  on	  the	  other	  had	  experienced	  and	  inflicted	  
human	  rights	  violations	  directed	  towards	  the	  enemy.	  Fighting	  had	  lasted	  over	  a	  year	  with	  
no	  end	  in	  sight.	  The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  had	  not	  passed	  any	  resolution	  that	  allowed	  
intervention,	  but	  NATO	  proceeded	  anyways,	  by	  unilaterally	  ordering	  air	  raids	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  ground	  and	  demand	  a	  ceasefire	  to	  end	  all	  civil	  strife	  between	  the	  
belligerents	  on	  both	  sides.	  On	  June	  10,	  1999,	  after	  78	  days,	  the	  air	  raid	  campaign	  by	  NATO	  
forces	  were	  called	  to	  stop.53	  On	  that	  same	  exact	  day	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  by	  
a	  14	  –	  0	  vote	  (with	  one	  abstention)	  passed	  UN	  Resolution	  1244.	  Resolution	  1244	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enumerated	  the	  objectives	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  Kosovo	  government	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  
stressed	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia.54	  One	  of	  
the	  big	  problems	  facing	  the	  UN	  and	  NATO	  was	  regarding	  what	  they	  were	  going	  to	  do	  with	  
the	  controlling	  government	  of	  Kosovo.	  Technically,	  the	  province	  of	  Kosovo	  was	  under	  the	  
control	  of	  the	  Serbian	  government.	  However,	  with	  the	  people	  in	  the	  territory	  experiencing	  
extreme	  violations	  of	  basic	  human	  rights,	  rights	  that	  are	  widely	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  
international	  community,	  the	  international	  organizations	  couldn’t	  stand	  by	  and	  allow	  the	  
violations	  and	  hardships	  to	  continue.	  	  
Resolution	  1244	  seemed	  to	  present	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  mediator	  coming	  to	  negotiate	  a	  
peaceful	  resolution	  to	  end	  the	  war	  rather	  than	  to	  take	  a	  position	  on	  external	  self	  
determination.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  specific	  definition	  of	  external	  self-­‐determination,	  the	  
concept	  encompasses	  a	  standard	  of	  customary	  human	  rights,	  and	  the	  right	  of	  an	  
appropriate	  body	  to	  enforce	  those	  standards.55	  These	  standards	  were	  laid	  out	  by	  the	  UN’s	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  The	  criterions	  that	  this	  declaration	  lays	  out	  
include;	  all	  human	  beings	  are	  born	  free	  and	  equal	  in	  dignity	  and	  rights,	  everyone	  has	  the	  
right	  to	  life,	  liberty	  and	  security	  of	  person,	  no	  one	  shall	  be	  held	  in	  slavery	  or	  servitude,	  no	  
one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  torture	  or	  to	  cruel,	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  
punishment,	  and	  everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  recognition	  everywhere	  as	  a	  person	  before	  the	  
law,	  to	  name	  only	  the	  first	  six	  articles.56	  If	  these	  standards	  are	  not	  met,	  then	  “groups	  of	  
people”	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  using	  this	  right.	  	  	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  external	  self-­‐determination,	  Resolution	  1244	  states	  that	  it	  wont	  
get	  involved	  in	  the	  territory	  dispute	  regarding	  minority	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  
whether	  or	  not	  those	  violations	  justify	  seccession	  by	  reaffirming	  the	  FRY’s	  territorial	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integrity.57	  According	  to	  a	  1996	  report	  done	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace,	  after	  a	  
discussion	  with	  the	  U.S	  Department	  of	  State’s	  Policy	  Planning,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  faced	  
pressure	  regarding	  this	  exact	  situation	  in	  other	  circumstances.	  The	  Report	  said	  that	  no	  
matter	  what	  the	  specific	  scenario	  is:	  
The	  rights	  to	  self	  determination	  must	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  right	  to	  secession	  and	  the	  
establishment	  of	  independent	  statehood,	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  there	  are	  
intermediate	  categories	  short	  of	  statehood	  that	  can	  address	  a	  minority	  group’s	  
interests	  and	  aspirations…Human	  rights	  violations	  are	  easy	  to	  condemn;	  the	  dilemma	  
is	  whether	  they	  justify	  the	  persecuted	  group’s	  secession	  from	  the	  state,	  a	  conclusion	  the	  
international	  community	  is	  largely	  unwilling	  to	  draw.58	  	  
Resolution	  1244	  only	  laid	  out	  the	  plan	  that	  the	  international	  organizations	  would	  
carry	  out.	  The	  specific	  entity	  that	  led	  the	  groundwork	  in	  Kosovo	  was	  the	  United	  Nations	  
Interim	  Administration	  Mission	  in	  Kosovo	  (UNMIK	  as	  it	  is	  referenced).	  UNMIK	  was	  founded	  
on	  the	  ground	  of	  four	  basic	  pillars	  (or	  principles).	  Each	  of	  these	  pillars	  were	  based	  on	  tasks	  
defined	  in	  Resolution	  1244,	  which	  contained	  an	  obligation	  of	  the	  FRY	  to	  end	  all	  violence,	  
withdraw	  all	  military,	  police	  and	  paramilitary	  forces	  from	  Kosovo,	  called	  for	  the	  KLA	  to	  end	  
all	  violent	  action	  and	  to	  demilitarize,	  and	  lastly	  established	  an	  “international	  civil	  
presence,”	  what	  would	  later	  be	  know	  as	  UNMIK.59	  Pillars	  1	  and	  2,	  Police	  and	  Justice	  
Administration	  and	  Civil	  Administration	  respectively,	  were	  led	  by	  the	  United	  Nations;	  Pillar	  
3,	  Democratization	  and	  Institution	  Building,	  were	  led	  by	  the	  Leadership	  of	  the	  organization	  
for	  security	  and	  cooperation	  in	  Europe	  (OSCE);	  while	  Pillar	  4,	  Restructuring	  the	  Economy	  
and	  Infrastructure,	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU).60	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The	  UNMIK’s	  purpose,	  as	  laid	  out	  by	  Resolution	  1244,	  was	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  interim	  
government	  while	  altercations	  between	  Serbia	  and	  the	  majority	  population	  of	  Kosovo	  
subsided	  as	  NATO	  and	  the	  Kosovo	  Force	  (KFOR)	  played	  the	  roles	  of	  traditional	  
peacekeepers.61	  The	  Kosovo	  Force	  had	  the	  responsibility	  of	  maintaining	  the	  safety	  and	  
protection	  of	  the	  UNMIK	  workers	  as	  well	  as	  other	  international	  organization	  workers.62	  
They	  were	  also	  given	  three	  tasks	  in	  addition	  to	  peacekeeping.	  Those	  tasks	  were	  to	  deter	  
new	  hostilities	  (peacekeeping),	  ensure	  that	  refugees	  can	  return	  safely,	  ensure	  
humanitarian	  aid	  can	  be	  delivered,	  and	  demining/monitoring	  the	  border.63	  The	  final	  goal	  of	  
the	  UNMIK	  was	  always	  to	  establish	  and	  develop	  a	  fully	  functioning,	  autonomous,	  and	  self	  
governing	  Kosovo,	  which	  could	  provide	  justice	  and	  security	  for	  the	  people.64	  This	  was	  
supposed	  to	  be	  done	  all	  while	  keeping	  Serbia’s	  sovereignty	  intact,	  because,	  as	  previously	  
stated,	  the	  UN	  did	  not	  want	  to	  address	  the	  situation	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  external	  self-­‐
determination.	  The	  “final	  status”	  as	  it	  was	  called,	  would	  be	  determined	  in	  the	  future	  by	  the	  
legislative	  process,	  once	  Kosovo	  had	  a	  stable	  government.65	  	  
Some	  question	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  NATO	  intervention	  in	  Kosovo,	  wondering	  
how	  these	  international	  organizations	  had	  the	  right	  to	  place	  themselves	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  
this	  intrastate	  war.	  In	  the	  UN	  Charter	  (governing	  powers	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  UN),	  Article	  
1	  Section	  2,	  it	  states,	  “The	  purposes	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  are	  to	  develop	  friendly	  relations	  
among	  nations	  based	  on	  respect	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  rights	  and	  self-­‐determination	  of	  
peoples,	  and	  to	  take	  other	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  strengthen	  universal	  peace.”66	  The	  
most	  basic	  founding	  principle	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  to	  bring	  about	  world	  peace	  and	  
security	  by	  uniting	  nations.	  When	  maintaining	  peace	  is	  subject	  to	  falsity	  then	  the	  UN	  must	  
act,	  even	  if	  just	  a	  small	  region	  in	  southeast	  Europe	  is	  in	  question.	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The	  events	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Kosovo	  have	  also	  long	  been	  discussed	  as	  being	  
essential	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect.	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  or	  R2P	  
as	  it	  is	  sometimes	  referred,	  is	  the	  proposed	  custom	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  right	  
and	  that	  state	  sovereignty	  is	  relinquished	  when	  that	  state,	  “fails	  to	  protect	  its	  population	  
from	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  other	  crimes	  against	  humanity.”67	  The	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  was	  adopted	  during	  the	  2005	  World	  Summit	  (where	  the	  largest	  
number	  of	  heads	  of	  state	  and	  government	  convened	  in	  one	  place	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  UN)	  
but	  it	  originated	  from	  the	  likes	  of	  then	  Assistant-­‐Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  UN	  Department	  
for	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  Kofi	  Annan68	  as	  well	  as	  a	  Canadian	  established	  commission	  
called	  the	  International	  Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty	  (ICISS).	  69	  The	  
need	  for	  an	  adoption	  of	  such	  a	  custom	  was	  based	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  international	  
community	  to	  mediate	  during	  the	  catastrophe	  that	  occurred	  in	  Rwanda	  in	  1994.	  In	  review	  
of	  the	  UN’s	  failure	  to	  remedy	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  Annan	  based	  his	  criticism	  on	  the	  fact	  
that	  there	  was	  no	  internationally	  accepted	  process	  to	  intervene	  in	  another	  country’s	  
domestic	  issues.	  	  
There	  was	  a	  way,	  however,	  and	  it	  was	  by	  a	  process	  called	  Humanitarian	  
Intervention,	  which	  is	  the	  course	  by	  which	  a	  state	  using	  military	  force	  against	  another	  
state,	  publically	  declares	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  said	  military	  force	  is	  to	  end	  human	  rights	  
violations	  being	  “perpetrated	  by	  the	  state	  against	  which	  [the	  military	  force]	  is	  directed,”70	  
but	  has	  also	  been	  defined	  less	  strictly	  so	  as	  to	  include	  “non	  forcible	  methods…to	  alleviate	  
mass	  human	  suffering	  within	  sovereign	  borders.”71	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  is	  a	  heavily	  
criticized	  method	  of	  peacekeeping	  because	  it	  directly	  goes	  against	  a	  main	  principle	  of	  the	  
UN,	  which	  is	  that	  states	  are	  sovereign	  within	  their	  boundaries,	  according	  to	  the	  UN	  Charter	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Article	  2(4).72	  However,	  the	  UN’s	  main	  focus	  is,	  in	  fact,	  maintaining	  peace	  and	  security.	  
Chapter	  VII,	  Article	  41	  requires	  the	  UN	  to	  consider	  non	  military	  action	  first	  and	  foremost	  to	  
calm	  breaches	  of	  peace,	  and,	  only	  if	  those	  peacekeeping	  provisions	  are	  deemed	  insufficient	  
to	  restoring	  peace	  may	  the	  UN	  authorize	  military	  force,	  according	  to	  Article	  42.73	  
Supporters	  of	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  look	  at	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  as	  a	  justifiable	  
means	  to	  an	  end.	  They	  place	  the	  importance	  of	  ending	  human	  rights	  violations	  ahead	  of	  
state	  sovereignty.	  Critics	  of	  this	  type	  of	  intervention,	  however,	  place	  tremendous	  weight	  on	  
viewing	  forced	  intervention	  as	  one	  entity	  imposing	  its	  will	  on	  another,	  and	  view	  this	  force	  
as	  lacking	  legal	  sanction	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  would	  be	  too	  simple	  to	  ambiguously	  
deploy	  this	  method.	  	  
Humanitarian	  Intervention	  and	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  while	  they	  each	  seek	  the	  
same	  solution,	  to	  end	  mass	  human	  rights	  violations,	  differ	  in	  a	  key	  way.	  Humanitarian	  
Intervention	  would	  occur	  by	  way	  of	  a	  resolution	  that	  is	  passed	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  
including	  approval	  from	  all	  five	  permanent	  members;	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  
Kingdom,	  China,	  Russian	  Federation,	  and	  France.	  If	  one	  of	  those	  five	  members	  were	  to	  veto	  
a	  resolution,	  for	  whatever	  the	  rationale	  may	  be	  (which	  is	  within	  their	  right	  as	  a	  permanent	  
member),	  then	  no	  intervention	  will	  transpire.	  If	  a	  resolution	  is	  passed	  then	  the	  state	  that	  is	  
being	  intervened	  upon	  loses	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  borders	  as	  the	  intervention	  proceeds	  and	  
peacekeeping	  forces	  enter	  the	  state.	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  
preventative	  measure	  that	  stresses	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  states	  to	  protect	  populations	  at	  
risk.74	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  accepts	  the	  right	  to	  intervene	  in	  order	  to	  
end	  the	  abuses	  by	  the	  violating	  state,	  while	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  transfers	  the	  focus	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towards	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  victims.	  It	  is	  also	  here	  where	  the	  two	  processes	  converge:	  
as	  both	  recognize	  that	  state	  sovereignty	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  right	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  
infringed	  upon.	  Where	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  is	  solely	  military	  action,	  Responsibility	  
to	  protect	  uses	  military	  intervention	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  that	  is	  only	  taken	  if	  a	  state	  does	  not	  
uphold	  its	  responsibility.	  This	  is	  the	  very	  reason	  why	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  is	  the	  
preferred	  practice	  by	  the	  UN.	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  pursues	  the	  foundational	  causes	  of	  
the	  four	  mass	  atrocity	  crimes	  that	  breach	  the	  peace,	  and	  then	  if	  action	  is	  required,	  the	  UN	  
will	  step	  in.	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  UN,	  to	  allow	  states	  to	  remedy	  
their	  own	  problems	  first,	  and	  keep	  territorial	  integrity,	  before	  imposing	  their	  will	  if	  the	  
situation	  in	  the	  state	  and	  region	  is	  dire	  enough	  to	  cause	  the	  UN	  to	  break	  one	  of	  its	  own	  
guiding	  principles,	  that	  of	  state	  sovereignty.	  	  
It	  was	  the	  initial	  surge	  by	  NATO,	  and	  the	  bombings	  done	  by	  NATO	  forces	  that	  
furthered	  the	  question	  of	  state	  sovereignty.	  In	  this	  time	  period,	  pre-­‐Responsibility	  to	  
Protect,	  the	  recognition	  of	  territorial	  integrity	  was	  prohibitive.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  
paragraphs,	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  was	  seen	  as	  inhibiting	  on	  a	  states	  right	  to	  act	  freely	  
within	  its	  borders.	  NATO	  decided	  to	  engage	  with	  Kosovo	  because,	  after	  the	  breakdown	  of	  
negotiations	  to	  a	  ceasefire	  between	  KLA	  and	  the	  Yugoslavian	  Army/Serbian	  Police,	  they	  
realized	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  end	  the	  civil	  strife	  was	  to	  deploy	  military	  forces.75	  The	  
ceasefire,	  which	  was	  initiated	  by	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1199,	  did	  not	  hold	  ground	  
as	  the	  agreed	  upon	  military	  count	  for	  Yugoslav	  forces	  deployed	  in	  Kosovo	  was	  breached	  
and	  provocations	  on	  behalf	  of	  both	  sides	  led	  to	  the	  fighting	  being	  resumed.76	  NATO	  had	  
agreed	  once	  before	  to	  call	  off	  planned	  air	  strikes	  after	  a	  promise	  of	  withdrawal	  of	  Serbian	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police	  and	  the	  Yugoslavian	  army	  in	  Kosovo77	  and	  this	  time	  around,	  NATO	  did	  not	  make	  the	  
same	  mistake.	  	  
NATO’s	  involvement	  without	  UN	  Security	  Council	  authorization	  and	  without	  a	  UN	  
Resolution	  in	  place	  was	  disconcerting,	  in	  a	  sense,	  because	  the	  practices	  stood	  on	  no	  legal	  
framework.	  NATO’s	  goals	  were	  to	  implement	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolutions	  without	  UN	  
Security	  Council	  authorization.78	  Without	  UN	  authorization,	  NATO	  was	  officially	  not	  
partaking	  in	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  but	  instead	  was	  infringing	  on	  Serbia’s	  territory	  
unilaterally,	  even	  if	  for	  a	  just	  cause.	  	  The	  “problem”	  with	  this	  situation	  was	  that,	  after	  the	  
bombings	  ended	  (and	  granted,	  there	  were	  upwards	  of	  2,500	  civilians	  who	  died,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
number	  estimated	  north	  of	  12,000	  who	  were	  injured	  by	  the	  78	  days	  of	  bombings79)	  NATO	  
was	  able	  to	  provide	  stability	  and	  security	  to	  the	  people	  in	  Kosovo	  and	  yet	  was	  doing	  it	  by	  
breaking	  International	  law.	  	  
In	  addition,	  NATO	  was	  not	  able	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  their	  founding	  Charter	  as	  valid	  
reasoning	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Under	  article	  5	  of	  NATO’s	  Charter,	  which	  outlines	  
collective	  defensive	  action	  that	  can	  be	  taken,	  it	  states	  that,	  “the	  principle	  of	  self	  defense	  is	  at	  
the	  very	  heart	  of	  NATO’s	  founding	  treaty.	  It	  remains	  a	  unique	  and	  enduring	  principle	  that	  
binds	  its	  members	  together,	  committing	  them	  to	  protect	  each	  other	  and	  setting	  a	  spirit	  of	  
solidarity.”80	  The	  biggest	  disconnect	  with	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  NATO,	  even	  for	  a	  just	  cause,	  
and	  the	  self	  defense	  article	  of	  their	  Charter,	  was	  that	  Serbia	  was	  not	  a	  NATO	  member	  (and	  
obviously	  neither	  was	  Kosovo)	  and	  therefore	  NATO’s	  actions	  were	  not	  based	  on	  the	  
collective	  self	  defense	  of	  a	  treaty	  member.	  It	  was	  the	  actions	  of	  NATO	  that	  did	  usurp	  on	  
Serbia’s	  sovereignty,	  but	  these	  actions	  were	  also	  able	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  violence	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between	  two	  warring	  sides.	  The	  fact	  that	  NATO	  operated	  on	  its	  own	  authorization	  will	  
always	  keep	  the	  positive	  outcomes	  of	  their	  actions	  under	  scrutinized	  light.	  	  
Because	  this	  conflict	  was	  purely	  domestic,	  it	  makes	  answering	  the	  inquiry	  into	  the	  
legality	  of	  the	  process	  much	  harder	  to	  rationalize,	  especially	  when	  the	  plan	  for	  peace	  
involves	  the	  takeover	  and	  intervention	  of	  a	  sovereign	  state.	  Article	  2	  Section	  7	  of	  the	  UN	  
Charter	  addresses	  this	  complexity	  by	  stating,	  “Nothing	  contained	  in	  the	  present	  Charter	  
shall	  authorize	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  intervene	  in	  matters	  which	  are	  essentially	  within	  the	  
domestic	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  state	  or	  shall	  require	  the	  members	  to	  submit	  such	  matters	  to	  
settlement	  under	  the	  present	  Charter;	  but	  this	  principle	  shall	  not	  prejudice	  the	  application	  
of	  enforcement	  measures	  under	  Chapter	  VII.”81	  This	  is	  the	  exact	  dilemma	  the	  UN	  and	  NATO	  
were	  facing,	  as	  state	  sovereignty	  is	  a	  central	  principle	  for	  UN.	  What	  the	  UN	  Charter	  outlines	  
is	  that	  states	  are	  very	  sovereign	  entities.	  Within	  borders,	  states	  can	  do	  almost	  anything	  
they	  want.	  If	  peace	  is	  disrupted	  though,	  then	  a	  state	  will	  have	  issues	  with	  the	  UN.	  	  
Even	  though	  Kosovo	  is	  a	  province	  of	  a	  sovereign	  state,	  Serbia,	  meaning	  that	  this	  
issue	  was	  intrastate,	  international	  organizations	  (such	  as	  NATO	  and	  the	  UN)	  sought	  out	  an	  
end	  to	  the	  serious	  human	  rights	  violations.	  Clearly	  the	  peace	  had	  been	  breached	  in	  Kosovo	  
and	  their	  reigning	  government	  was	  the	  center	  of	  the	  problem.	  Again,	  the	  UN	  in	  ‘The	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights’,	  which	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  
on	  December	  10,	  1948,	  has	  outlined	  basic	  human	  rights.82	  Here	  are	  articles	  1-­‐8,	  directly	  
from	  the	  declaration	  itself:	  
Article	  1	  -­‐	  All	  human	  beings	  are	  born	  free	  and	  equal	  in	  dignity	  and	  rights	  
Article	  2	  -­‐	  Everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  all	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  set	  forth	  in	  this	  Declaration	  
without	  distinction	  of	  any	  kind	  
Article	  3	  –	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  life,	  liberty	  and	  security	  of	  person	  
Article	  4	  -­‐	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  held	  in	  slavery	  or	  servitude;	  slavery	  and	  the	  slave	  trade	  shall	  
be	  prohibited	  in	  all	  their	  forms.	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Article	  5	  -­‐	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  torture	  or	  to	  cruel,	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  
treatment	  or	  punishment	  
Article	  6	  –	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  recognition	  everywhere	  as	  a	  person	  before	  the	  
law.	  
Article	  7	  -­‐	  All	  are	  equal	  before	  the	  law	  and	  are	  entitled	  without	  any	  discrimination	  to	  
equal	  protection	  of	  the	  law.	  All	  are	  entitled	  to	  equal	  protection	  against	  any	  
discrimination	  in	  violation	  of	  this	  Declaration	  and	  against	  any	  incitement	  to	  such	  
discrimination.	  
Article	  8	  -­‐	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  an	  effective	  remedy	  by	  the	  competent	  national	  
tribunals	  for	  acts	  violating	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  granted	  him	  by	  the	  constitution	  or	  
by	  law	  
	  
There	  are	  conflicting	  reviews	  on	  this	  matter,	  but	  it	  is	  my	  belief	  that	  the	  response	  
from	  NATO	  and	  the	  UN	  was	  an	  action	  that	  was	  absolutely	  afforded	  to	  the	  Kosovar	  
Albanians.	  This	  group	  of	  people	  was	  experiencing	  discrimination	  by	  their	  own	  government.	  
There	  was	  no	  adequate	  power	  that	  those	  discriminated	  against	  could	  fall	  back	  on,	  except	  
for	  international	  organizations,	  whose	  fundamental	  goals	  and	  principles	  were	  that	  which	  
could	  end	  the	  suffering	  and	  provide	  security	  and	  peace	  that	  had	  been	  missing	  in	  the	  region	  
for	  decades.	  	  The	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  article	  10,	  does	  afford	  a	  remedy	  
directed	  towards	  those	  whose	  rights	  are	  taken,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  “fair	  and	  public	  hearing	  by	  an	  
independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal,	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  his	  rights	  and	  obligations,	  and	  
of	  any	  criminal	  charges	  against	  him.”83	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  remedy,	  mentioned	  by	  article	  
10,	  is	  that	  without	  intervention	  from	  an	  outside	  source,	  no	  violator	  would	  ever	  get	  to	  a	  
hearing	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  could	  very	  well	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  all	  circumstances	  of	  mass	  
human	  rights	  violations,	  and	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  new	  remedies	  should	  be	  provided	  that	  do	  
allow	  the	  international	  community	  to	  intervene.	  
This	  war	  occurring	  in	  Kosovo,	  that	  caused	  the	  subsequent	  intervention	  by	  NATO	  
and	  the	  UN,	  was	  the	  basis	  in	  which	  entry	  by	  these	  organizations	  would	  be	  justified.	  The	  
entire	  process,	  starting	  with	  the	  creation	  and	  adoption	  of	  Resolution	  1244	  and	  the	  ensuing	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UNMIK	  government	  takeover,	  was	  meant	  as	  intervention	  to	  end	  the	  human	  rights	  
violations,	  first	  and	  foremost.	  On	  the	  very	  first	  page	  of	  Resolution	  1244	  it	  is	  stated,	  
“Determined	  to	  resolve	  the	  grave	  humanitarian	  situation	  in	  Kosovo,	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  
Yugoslavia	  and	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  safe	  and	  free	  return	  of	  all	  refugees	  and	  displaced	  persons	  
to	  their	  homes.”84	  This	  determination	  is	  followed	  up	  with,	  “Condemning	  all	  acts	  of	  violence	  
against	  the	  Kosovo	  Population	  as	  well	  as	  all	  terrorists	  acts	  by	  any	  party.”85	  These	  goals	  
provide	  clear	  justification	  for	  the	  international	  communities	  response.	  	  
The	  arguments	  that	  NATO	  and	  the	  UN	  were	  simply	  exerting	  their	  power	  and	  
influence	  on	  an	  unwilling	  nation	  do	  not	  hold	  much	  weight.	  There	  have	  been	  prior	  conflicts,	  
both	  inter-­‐	  and	  intra-­‐state,	  that	  have	  resulted	  in	  force	  being	  taken	  against	  independent	  
nations,	  sometimes	  for	  motives	  in	  which	  are	  not	  openly	  admitted	  (see:	  US	  invasion	  in	  Iraq).	  
Most	  of	  those	  situations	  involve	  outward	  threats	  upon	  which	  action	  is	  taken.	  In	  the	  
instance	  of	  the	  Kosovo	  War,	  there	  were	  no	  threats	  made	  to	  a	  state	  that	  the	  UN	  needed	  to	  
act	  on	  but	  rather	  severe	  human	  rights	  violations	  that	  interfered	  with	  a	  main	  principle	  of	  
international	  law.	  The	  conflict	  was	  disturbing	  the	  region	  and	  the	  international	  
organizations	  knew	  they	  needed	  to	  intervene.86	  
Final	  Status	  
In	  situations	  regarding	  discrimination	  towards	  a	  “group	  of	  peoples”	  where	  human	  
rights	  violations	  occur,	  there	  are	  remedies,	  such	  as	  exercising	  ones	  right	  of	  self-­‐
determination,	  available	  to	  end	  the	  violence	  and	  repression.	  The	  term	  “group	  of	  peoples”	  is	  
commonly	  defined	  as	  “a	  group	  of	  people	  living	  in	  a	  delimited	  territory	  which	  possesses	  and	  
is	  closely	  connected	  by	  a	  distinct	  history,	  language	  or	  other	  cultural	  attributes,	  and	  which	  is	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striving	  to	  preserve	  these	  characteristics.87	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  meet	  the	  criteria	  as	  right	  
holders	  in	  the	  situation	  they	  were	  experiencing	  in	  Kosovo.	  	  
Opponents	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  external	  self-­‐determination	  wonder	  why	  the	  Kosovar	  
Albanians	  are	  legally	  entitled	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  in	  this	  
instance.	  Kosovo’s	  exercise	  of	  this	  right	  does	  entail	  an	  extreme	  circumstance	  because	  the	  
government	  of	  Kosovo’s	  own	  sovereign	  state	  was	  the	  party	  committing	  the	  heinous	  crimes.	  
Their	  only	  option	  was	  secession.	  Going	  back	  to	  being	  an	  autonomous	  province	  under	  
Serbia’s	  control,	  as	  they	  were	  prior	  to	  1989	  when	  Milosevic	  took	  over,	  was	  not	  an	  option.	  
The	  unification	  of	  the	  two	  territories	  had	  not	  worked	  previously	  and	  after	  the	  amount	  of	  
death,	  displacement	  of	  people,	  and	  other	  actions	  of	  violence	  and	  human	  rights	  violations,	  
that	  each	  party	  participated	  in,	  sealed	  the	  fate	  that	  there	  was	  no	  going	  back	  to	  the	  way	  
things	  were.	  As	  stated	  previously,	  the	  1974	  Yugoslavian	  Constitution	  had	  even	  given	  
Kosovo	  what	  amounted	  to	  the	  same	  rights	  that	  Serbia	  had	  as	  a	  republic	  in	  the	  SFRY	  before	  
Serbia	  took	  those	  rights	  were	  taken	  away.	  It	  is	  my	  belief	  that	  if	  Kosovo	  was	  forced	  to	  
remain	  as	  an	  autonomous	  province	  of	  Serbia,	  the	  Kosovar	  Albanians,	  who	  still	  made	  up	  an	  
overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  and	  who	  wanted	  independence	  before	  the	  war	  
even	  began,	  would	  absolutely	  still	  want	  independence.	  Luis	  Cabrera,	  in	  his	  book	  “Global	  
Governance,	  Global	  Government:	  Institutional	  Visions	  for	  an	  Evolving	  World	  Systems”	  
states:	  
A	  commitment	  to	  preventing	  human	  rights	  violations	  by	  one's	  own	  government	  makes	  
the	  involvement	  of	  international	  institutions	  necessary.	  We	  often	  think	  of	  international	  
human	  rights	  institutions	  as	  a	  means	  for	  certain	  countries	  to	  improve	  the	  human	  
rights	  record	  of	  other	  countries.	  But	  international	  human	  rights	  institutions	  also	  help	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democracies	  fulfill	  their	  own	  constitutional	  commitments.	  They	  complete	  the	  domestic	  
constitutional	  order.88	  
The	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  were	  faced	  with	  seeking	  secession	  or	  remaining	  under	  sovereign	  
control	  of	  Serbia,	  and	  a	  government	  that	  represses	  entire	  ethnic	  groups.	  This	  was	  a	  
situation	  that	  was	  extreme	  enough	  to	  warrant	  a	  declaration	  of	  independence.	  	  
The	  external	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  has	  been	  used	  sparingly	  in	  the	  past	  and	  it	  
should	  continue	  to	  only	  be	  used	  in	  extreme	  circumstances	  where	  there	  is	  no	  future	  
arrangement	  that	  could	  peacefully	  end	  the	  violence.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  situation	  in	  Kosovo	  is	  
an	  instance	  where	  secession	  should	  be	  approved.	  It	  is	  important	  to,	  again,	  acknowledge	  
that	  the	  international	  organizations	  did	  not	  intervene	  so	  as	  to	  lead	  to	  this	  end	  result	  of	  
secession.	  They	  have	  directly	  stated	  (in	  Resolution	  1244)	  that	  the	  final	  future	  status	  was	  
not	  going	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  organizations	  themselves,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  interim	  
administration	  would	  help	  the	  people	  of	  Kosovo	  govern	  themselves.	  Essentially,	  self-­‐
governance,	  not	  necessarily	  as	  an	  independent	  state,	  but	  one	  that	  could	  support	  itself,	  was	  
the	  final	  act	  that	  was	  laid	  out	  by	  the	  UNMIK	  and	  was	  therefore	  left	  up	  to	  the	  people	  of	  
Kosovo	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  should	  declare	  independence	  or	  not.	  Once	  a	  
government	  was	  set	  up	  for	  Kosovo	  to	  govern	  themselves,	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  
their	  own	  final	  status,	  otherwise	  known	  as	  self-­‐determination.	  
Resolution	  1244	  and	  UNMIK	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  as	  to	  the	  final	  
status	  of	  Kosovo.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  prior	  paragraphs,	  Kosovo	  was	  to	  determine	  its	  final	  
status,	  with	  an	  overview	  done	  by	  the	  UN.	  On	  February	  23,	  1999	  the	  UN	  attempted	  to	  
achieve	  a	  more	  conclusive	  final	  status	  arrangement,	  for	  sometime	  in	  the	  future	  after	  
Kosovo	  had	  a	  stable	  government,	  between	  Kosovo	  and	  Serbia	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Interim	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Agreement	  for	  Peace	  and	  Self-­‐Government	  in	  Kosovo.’89	  This	  agreement,	  known	  as	  the	  
Rambouillet	  Agreement,	  was	  not	  signed	  by	  Serbia,	  but	  was	  given	  effect	  anyways	  by	  
Resolution	  1244.	  The	  agreement	  called	  for	  a	  new	  constitution	  for	  Kosovo	  that	  respects	  
territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  FRY	  (keeping	  intact	  Serbia’s	  sovereignty,	  for	  the	  time	  being	  at	  
least),	  while	  also	  “establishing	  the	  principles	  of	  democratic	  self-­‐government	  for	  three	  years	  
until	  final	  status	  of	  Kosovo	  is	  determined.”90	  The	  agreement	  called	  for	  the	  “will	  of	  the	  
people	  of	  Kosovo”	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  main	  principles	  that	  will	  define	  Kosovo’s	  future	  status.91	  
Obviously,	  Serbia	  knew	  how	  the	  people	  would	  vote	  because	  of	  the	  majority	  population	  
being	  Kosovar	  Albanians.	  However,	  the	  agreement,	  if	  it	  had	  been	  signed,	  also	  gave	  the	  FRY	  
“competence	  over	  Kosovo”	  over	  the	  following	  areas;	  territorial	  integrity,	  maintaining	  a	  
common	  market	  within	  the	  FRY,	  monetary	  policy,	  defense,	  foreign	  policy,	  customs	  services,	  
federal	  taxation,	  and	  federal	  elections.92	  	  
On	  February	  17,	  2008	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  declared	  independence	  from	  SR	  
Serbia	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia.93	  They	  did	  so	  acting	  outside	  of	  the	  UN	  
Provisional	  Institutions	  of	  Self-­‐Government.	  In	  the	  declaration,	  the	  people	  of	  Kosovo	  named	  
the	  years	  of	  strife	  and	  violence	  as	  a	  disturbance	  that	  held	  up	  the	  advancement	  of	  their	  
society.94	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  came	  into	  effect	  in	  June	  of	  2008	  and	  
the	  state	  has	  been	  sovereign	  ever	  since.	  The	  day	  after	  declaring	  independence,	  the	  United	  
States	  officially	  recognized	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo	  as	  an	  independent	  state.95	  Since	  the	  date	  
of	  declaring	  independence,	  Kosovo	  has	  been	  officially	  recognized	  by	  108	  of	  193	  members	  
of	  the	  UN,	  23	  of	  28	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  24	  of	  28	  NATO	  member	  states.96	  
SR	  Serbia	  still	  does	  not	  officially	  recognize	  Kosovo	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  but	  the	  two	  
nations	  have	  begun	  repairing	  and	  normalizing	  their	  relations.	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Assessment	  by	  the	  ICJ	  	  
Just	  over	  a	  month	  after	  Kosovo	  declared	  independence,	  Serbia	  called	  for	  the	  UN	  
General	  Assembly	  to	  ask	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ)	  to	  determine	  a	  ruling	  on	  the	  
legality	  of	  Kosovo’s	  declaration	  of	  independence.97	  The	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  a	  
ruling	  body,	  a	  “judicial	  organ,”	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  was	  established	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
United	  Nations	  Charter	  in	  1945.98	  They	  make	  rulings	  to	  settle	  legal	  disputes	  between	  
nations	  according	  to	  accepted	  international	  law.	  The	  rulings	  brought	  down	  by	  the	  court	  are	  
simply,	  just	  advisory	  opinions	  because	  nations	  have	  to	  submit	  themselves	  to	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of	  the	  court	  meaning	  that	  whatever	  the	  ICJ	  decides	  is	  not	  legally	  binding.	  With	  
regard	  to	  Kosovo,	  Serbia	  asked	  for	  an	  ICJ	  ruling	  as	  to	  whether	  Kosovo	  was	  in	  breach	  of	  
international	  law	  by	  unilaterally	  declaring	  independence.	  The	  issue	  concerned	  many	  
countries,	  with	  many	  being	  focused	  on	  whether	  Kosovo’s	  unilateral	  actions,	  and	  possible	  
approval	  by	  the	  ICJ,	  would	  set	  precedent	  for	  other	  provinces	  that	  were	  seeking	  to	  become	  
independent	  states.	  For	  example,	  Catalonia	  in	  Spain	  and	  West	  Papua	  in	  Indonesia	  were	  
both	  regions	  that	  secession	  was	  sought	  after,	  and	  would	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  ICJ	  advisory	  
opinion.	  	  
In	  all,	  there	  were	  35	  countries	  that	  supplied	  written	  statements	  either	  for	  or	  against	  
Kosovo’s	  declaration	  of	  independence.99	  Serbia	  was	  the	  first	  country	  to	  present	  its	  case	  to	  
the	  Court.	  Their	  rationale	  for	  opposition	  to	  the	  declaration	  can	  be	  summarized	  by	  a	  couple	  
of	  points.	  Principally,	  Kosovo,	  by	  unilaterally	  declaring	  independence,	  was	  directly	  
challenging	  the	  international	  legal	  order	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  
territorial	  integrity.100	  Kosovo	  was	  called	  the,	  “historical	  cradle	  of	  Serbia	  and	  constitutes	  
one	  of	  the	  essential	  pillars	  of	  its	  identity”	  by	  Dušan	  Bataković,	  the	  Ambassador	  of	  Serbia	  to	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France,	  who	  represented	  Serbia	  at	  the	  hearing.101	  Serbia	  argued	  that	  Kosovo’s	  declaration	  
was	  made	  by	  the	  temporary	  Kosovo	  government	  and	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  UN	  Resolution	  
1244	  which	  guaranteed	  territorial	  integrity	  to	  the	  FRY;	  and	  that	  granting	  Kosovo’s	  
unilateral	  declaration	  would	  set	  dangerous	  precedent	  if	  other	  countries	  with	  UN	  
administration	  concluded	  that	  the	  arrival	  of	  peacekeeping	  forces	  represented	  the	  first	  step	  
in	  the	  secession	  of	  a	  region.102	  	  
Kosovo	  was	  next	  to	  present	  and	  was	  represented	  by	  Skënder	  Hyseni,	  their	  Foreign	  
Minister.	  Kosovo’s	  main	  argument	  was	  that	  Serbia	  gave	  up	  its	  right	  over	  the	  province	  of	  
Kosovo	  because	  of	  Serbia’s	  massive	  human	  rights	  violations	  towards	  the	  Kosovar	  
Albanians.103	  In	  making	  the	  argument	  that	  Serbia	  “gave	  up	  its	  right”	  to	  the	  province,	  Kosovo	  
reasoned	  that	  it	  was	  Serbia’s	  own	  doing	  that	  caused	  their	  territorial	  integrity	  to	  diminish	  as	  
they	  failed	  in	  their	  “Responsibility	  to	  Protect.”	  Kosovo	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  Serbian	  
government	  would	  never	  be	  open	  to	  recognizing	  Kosovo	  as	  independent	  no	  matter	  how	  
long	  negotiations	  lasted.	  This	  was	  demonstrated	  by	  Serbia’s	  1990	  Constitutional	  changes	  
which	  stated	  that	  Kosovo	  (and	  another	  Serbian	  province,	  Metohija)	  were	  both	  an	  integral	  
part	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  Serbia,	  that	  it	  has	  the	  status	  of	  substantial	  autonomy	  within	  the	  
sovereign	  state	  of	  Serbia.104	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  two	  main	  parties	  in	  the	  case,	  there	  were	  27	  other	  countries	  to	  
supply	  oral	  arguments.	  Albania,	  which	  was	  in	  full	  support	  of	  independence	  for	  Kosovo	  
stated	  that	  there	  are,	  “two	  situations	  where	  a	  declaration	  of	  independence	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  
international	  law…first,	  the	  situation	  of	  illegal	  intervention,	  and	  secondly,	  the	  violation	  of	  
specific	  mandatory	  rules	  of	  international	  law.”105	  Albania	  went	  on	  to	  use	  the	  example	  of	  
Northern	  Cyprus	  to	  show	  that	  Kosovo	  did	  not	  fit	  in	  with	  the	  first	  situation.	  Albania	  stated,	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“A	  particular	  telling	  example	  [of	  a	  situation	  of	  illegal	  intervention]	  is,	  of	  course,	  Northern	  
Cyprus.	  	  No	  state	  except	  the	  one	  having	  intervened	  recognized	  the	  declaration	  of	  
independence	  of	  Northern	  Cyrpus.”106	  This	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  multiple	  states	  that	  
recognized	  Kosovo’s	  declaration,	  just	  days	  (or	  in	  some	  instances,	  the	  very	  next	  day)	  after	  
declaring,	  including	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.107	  Albania,	  throughout	  their	  
oral	  arguments	  continued	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  declaration	  of	  independence	  was	  not	  the	  result	  
of	  foreign	  intervention	  but	  rather	  was	  the	  consequence	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  by	  the	  
Serbian	  government	  that	  forced	  a	  secessionist	  movement	  by	  the	  majority	  population	  of	  
Kosovo,	  and,	  therefore,	  this	  was	  a	  statement	  of	  self	  determination.108	  	  The	  United	  States,	  in	  
their	  statement	  recognizing	  Kosovo	  indicated	  Kosovo’s	  situation	  was	  a	  “special	  case,”	  
according	  to	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Condoleezza	  Rice,	  and	  that	  it	  “cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
precedent	  for	  any	  other	  situation	  in	  the	  world	  today.”109	  	  
Finally,	  on	  July	  22,	  2010	  the	  ICJ	  delivered	  its	  advisory	  opinion	  on	  the	  matter.110	  The	  
opinion	  declared,	  by	  a	  10-­‐4	  vote,	  that	  Kosovo	  did	  not	  break	  international	  law	  by	  
unilaterally	  declaring	  independence	  for	  a	  few	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  ICJ	  stated	  that	  
international	  law	  contains	  no	  applicable	  prohibition	  on	  declarations	  of	  independence.111	  
Second,	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  declaration	  of	  independence	  did	  not	  violate	  UN	  Security	  Council	  
Resolution	  1244	  because	  Resolution	  1244	  did	  not	  outline	  Kosovo’s	  final	  status.	  Lastly,	  the	  
declaration	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council’s	  right	  to	  determine	  the	  final	  status	  of	  
Kosovo	  because	  the	  Security	  Council	  had	  not	  previously	  reserved	  that	  right	  for	  itself	  in	  
Resolution	  1244.112	  The	  President	  of	  the	  ICJ,	  Justice	  Hisashi	  Owada	  of	  Japan,	  further	  stated	  
that	  the	  question	  asked	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  solve	  was	  one	  of	  legality.	  He	  explained	  that	  there	  
was	  no	  international	  law	  preventing	  declarations	  of	  independence,	  which	  is	  what	  occurred	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in	  Kosovo.	  The	  concern	  that	  future	  provinces	  and	  territories	  would	  declare	  independence	  
was	  not	  asked	  of	  the	  Court	  in	  this	  instance	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  point,	  if	  future	  countries	  
did	  in	  fact	  declare,	  that	  would	  also	  not	  be	  a	  legal	  question	  but	  rather	  a	  political	  one,	  in	  
terms	  of	  each	  states	  recognition	  of	  future	  declarations.	  	  
Vice	  President	  of	  the	  ICJ,	  Justice	  Peter	  Tomka	  of	  Slovakia,	  provided	  a	  declaration	  to	  
the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  reasoned	  that	  the	  Court	  should	  not	  have	  accepted	  to	  hear	  the	  
case	  at	  all	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  the	  only	  body	  that	  can	  request	  a	  
hearing	  from	  the	  ICJ,	  did	  not	  have	  “sufficient	  interest”	  in	  asking	  for	  a	  judgment.113	  The	  lack	  
of	  “sufficient	  interest”	  originates	  from	  the	  circumstance	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  remained	  
active	  in	  the	  situation	  of	  Kosovo	  and	  that	  fact	  alone	  should	  have	  prevented	  the	  General	  
Assembly	  from	  requesting	  that	  any	  determination	  on	  Kosovo	  be	  made	  by	  the	  Court.114	  
Justice	  Abdul	  Koroma	  of	  Sierra	  Leone	  dissented	  to	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Court.	  His	  rationale	  
was	  based	  on	  his	  interpretation	  of	  why	  the	  General	  Assembly	  wanted	  an	  ICJ	  advisory	  
opinion,	  which	  was	  that	  he	  viewed	  the	  request	  as	  the	  “beginning	  of	  a	  process	  aimed	  at	  
separating	  Kosovo	  from	  the	  State	  to	  which	  it	  belongs	  and	  creating	  a	  new	  State.”115	  Justice	  
Koroma	  continued	  that	  the	  Court	  should	  not	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  author’s	  (whom	  the	  court	  
determined	  were	  representatives	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Kosovo	  rather	  than	  the	  UNMIK)	  intent	  
but	  should	  have	  instead	  looked	  at,	  “the	  intent	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  Resolution	  1244,	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Conclusion:	  	  
	   The	  summation	  of	  my	  research	  led	  me	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  not	  only	  did	  the	  people	  
of	  Kosovo	  have	  the	  right	  to	  exercise	  use	  of	  external	  self-­‐determination,	  but	  that	  it	  was	  vital	  
to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  ethnic	  groups	  that	  faced	  discrimination,	  mainly	  the	  Kosovar	  
Albanians.	  In	  order	  for	  their	  society	  to	  thrive	  and	  for	  their	  people	  to	  prosper,	  Kosovo	  
needed	  to	  create	  separation	  between	  themselves	  and	  their	  repressor,	  Socialist	  Republic	  of	  
Serbia.	  	  
The	  severe	  human	  rights	  violations,	  and	  sporadic	  dispersal	  of	  refugees	  in	  the	  
neighboring	  states	  caused	  tremendous	  strife	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  thus	  created	  problems	  of	  
keeping	  peace.	  Because	  of	  the	  issues	  regarding	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  the	  region,	  North	  
Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  intervened	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  bring	  both	  sides	  to	  a	  
ceasefire	  and	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  ground.	  	  This	  control	  would	  allow	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  
to	  pass	  Resolution	  1244,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  established	  the	  United	  Nations	  Interim	  
Administration	  Mission	  in	  Kosovo	  (UNMIK).	  UNMIK	  took	  over	  administrative	  duties	  of	  
Kosovo	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  government	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Kosovo	  and	  to	  
hopefully	  allow	  all	  dispersed	  persons	  to	  return	  safely	  to	  their	  homes.	  	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  communication	  and	  ability	  to	  work	  with	  one	  another,	  between	  the	  
people	  and	  governments	  of	  Kosovo	  and	  Serbia,	  was	  the	  essential	  factor	  that	  led	  to	  
instability	  in	  region.	  NATO,	  without	  consent	  from	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  was	  able	  to	  
provide	  a	  temporary	  stop	  to	  the	  violence	  on	  the	  streets	  and	  allowed	  the	  UNMIK	  to	  provide	  
a	  bridge	  in	  the	  Kosovo	  government,	  from	  their	  prior	  destabilized	  establishment	  and	  
assembly,	  to	  what	  is	  in	  place	  today.	  Today,	  Kosovo	  is	  lead	  by	  a	  Constitution	  that	  respects	  
	  
	   37	  
the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  and	  is	  recognized	  by	  many	  UN	  members	  around	  the	  world	  as	  a	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